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On February 24-25, 2006 an international workshop on “Regional and 
International Currency Arrangements” was held in Vienna. It was co-sponsored by 
the Oesterreichische Nationalbank and the Bank of Greece, and jointly organized 
by Eduard Hochreiter and George Tavlas. Academic economists and researchers 
from central banks and international organizations presented and discussed current 
research, and reviewed and assessed the past experience with, and the future 
challenges of, international currency arrangements. A number of papers and the 
contributions by the discussants presented at this workshop are being made 
available to a broader audience in the Working Paper series of the Bank of Greece 
and simultaneously also in the Working Paper Series of the Oesterreichische 
Nationalbank. The papers and the discussants’ comments will be published in the 
journal, International Economics and Economic Policy. Here we present the sixth 
of these Working Papers. (The previous five were issued as Bank of Greece 
Working Papers No. 39 to 43.) This Working Paper contains two papers on the 
topic “What About a World Currency?”; one more affirmative, the other more 
critical. In addition to the papers by Richard Cooper and Michael Bordo and 
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Proposal for a Common Currency among Rich Democracies 
 





  This paper suggests that some time in the not-too-distant future the governments 
of the industrialized democracies – concretely, the United States, the European Union, 
and Japan – should consider establishing a common currency for their collective use.  A 
common currency would credibly eliminate exchange rate uncertainty and exchange rate 
movements among major currencies, both of which are significant sources of disturbance 
to important economies.  One currency would of course entail one monetary policy for 
the currency area, and a political mechanism to assure accountability.  This proposal is 
not realistic today, but is set as a vision for the second or third decade into the 21
st 
century.  Europeans, in creating EMU, have taken a major step in the direction indicated.  
Their idea could be taken further. 
 
How would a common currency work? 
  The following paragraphs sketch how the common currency might be constituted, 
how it might be expected to function, and how it might be reached.  The key components to 
a common currency area would be the United States, the members of the European 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), Japan, and probably the United Kingdom (which 
might by time of adoption in any case be a member of EMU). These countries constitute the 
core of the international monetary system, and are likely to do so for decades to come. They 
all have high incomes and similar structures of demand and output. Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand -- indeed any of today's 30 members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) -- would be welcome to join, although for reasons given below 
becoming full members might be unwise.  Members must have democratic governments, to 
ensure legitimacy.  Other countries could, at the initiative of each, link their currencies to the 
key currency.  The common currency could be given any name that commanded wide   6
acceptance -- e.g., bancor (the name suggested by Keynes for his international central bank 
currency), crown, dirham (the name of the major Roman unit of currency), or ena (for 
europe-nippon-america).  The common currency might, but need not, imply common 
banknotes for ordinary circulation.  Member countries could continue to circulate banknotes 
containing national symbols, just as (before introduction of the new, hard-to-counterfeit 
higher-denomination bills) Federal Reserve notes within the United States could be 
separately identified with the twelve Reserve banks of issue, and even with different names.  
Euro coins also contain different national symbols.  The central point is that they would be 
fully convertible into one another at a rigidly fixed exchange rate, and electronic payments 
would all take place in the common currency. 
  One currency requires a single monetary policy.  Monetary policy could be made by 
a Board of Governors, made up either of pre-existing central bank governors (existing 
central banks would continue as branches) or of individuals appointed to long terms for their 
knowledge and probity, or of some combination of the two.  If it were made up of governors 
of the national central banks alone, votes would be apportioned according to GDP, updated 
at regular intervals.     
  The Governing Board would decide monetary policy throughout the currency area.  
But it needs to be made politically accountable, a serious deficiency (in my view) with the 
current arrangements of Europe's EMU, where the ECB must report to the Europoean 
Parliament, but the latter body can take no effective action with respect to monetary policy.  
Only amendment of the Maastricht Treaty, requiring unanimity among all European Union 
members, can do that.   In contrast, the US Federal Reserve, while independent of the 
executive branch of government, is not independent of the political process, hence political 
accountability, since its statutes are determined by simple legislation, which could be altered 
through the normal legislative process.  The same was true of the German Bundesbank 
before its absorption into the framework of the EMU.  A supra-national parliament is not 
required, however, to make the Board of Governors accountable.  Its decisions could be 
over-ruled by a heavy (e.g. 70 percent) vote of national governments as represented by 
ministers of finance, with votes apportioned by GNP, who are ultimately accountable to 
parliaments.  Such action would presumably be rare, but if in the collective judgement of 
governments the Board of Governors was pursuing grossly inappropriate actions, its actions   7
could be countermanded.  This possibility would itself likely be sufficient to keep monetary 
policy within the bounds of public acceptability. 
  The objective of monetary policy should be to maintain "stability of the currency," 
an artful phrase drawn from the statutes of the German Bundesbank, which leaves 
somewhat more latitude than the primary charge of the Maastricht Treaty to the European 
Central Bank to maintain "price stability."  The Board of Governors should also look after 
the soundness and smooth functioning of the financial system, a responsibility erroneously 
not given to the ECB, acting as appropriate as a lender of last resort.  And of course it should 
cooperate with governments in the pursuit of their general macro-economic objectives. 
 
Rationale for the Proposal 
  Flexible exchange rates have obtained since 1973 among the major currencies of the 
world: the US dollar, the Japanese yen, the British pound, the Canadian dollar, and the 
continental European currencies centered around the German mark.  In contrast to what 
Nurkse(1944) might have expected, the experience has not been a disastrous one, and 
indeed arguably floating exchange rates helped their economies navigate more smoothly 
among some major world disturbances, such as the oil price shocks of 1974, 1979-80, and 
1986 and the German unification of 1990.  On the other hand, some have argued that 
because world oil prices are denominated in dollars the three oil shocks themselves were 
caused by sharp movements in dollar exchange rates.  While I find this implausible, the fact 
that the case can be put forward suggests the complexities of cause and effect when it comes 
to currency arrangements and their impacts on real economies.   
  Nominal and real exchange rates also responded strongly to the "fiscal twist" of the 
early 1980s, when the United States pursued an expansionist fiscal policy while Britain, 
Germany, and Japan, later joined by France, pursued contractionary fiscal policies.  Whether 
one assesses the consequential sharp appreciation of the dollar in the early 1980s as benign 
or malign, it certainly had real and durable effects not only on foreign trade but also on the 
structure of output, not least because of high fixed costs sometimes associated with product 
entry into a national market (as emphasized by Krugman, 1989).  Arguably the depth and 
duration of Japan's recession in the 1990s can be explained in part by excessive exchange-  8
rate-induced industrial expansion in Japan in the mid-1980s, when the cheap yen made 
Japanese goods highly competitive in the American market.  
  More recently, the dollar-yen exchange rate reached 85 yen per dollar briefly in 
1995 and then moved to 145 yen/$ briefly in 1998, a swing of 70 percent over three years 
(and back to 108 yen/$ by early 1999).  The USA and Japan were both successfully 
pursuing low inflation monetary policies (Japan at 1 percent, USA at 2.3 percent increase in 
the consumer price index per year).  What then justifies a swing of this magnitude?  What 
disturbance does it create for trade (e.g. in stimulating anti-dumping suits by US firms
1) and 
for investment planning -- not only for exports, but for a domestic market subject to import 
competition?  What disturbance does it create for balance sheets, especially of financial 
institutions?  How many economically sound firms were thrown into bankruptcy?  Might 
the prolonged recession in Japan -- including extensive overseas investment by Japanese 
firms -- be related in part to fear of wide swings in exchange rates?  Are they hedging 
against future exchange rate uncertainty by diversifying their production across currency 
zones, especially into Europe and into North America?  Exchange rate movements of this 
type certainly violate the expectations and contentions of advocates of floating rates in the 
1960s (e.g., Johnson) and they cannot signify well-functioning international monetary 
arrangements.  
  The euro also went through some gyrations after its introduction in January 1999.  It 
started at $1.17 per euro, fell eratically to $.83 in the fall of 2001, and subsequently rose to 
briefly to $1.38 in late 2004 – a swing of 66 percent – before settling into the $1.20-1.30 
range during 2005.  Surely one of the factors inhibiting investment in Europe and Japan in 
recent years is the prospect  -- some would say the certainty -- that in the not-too-distant 
future the euro and the yen will appreciate substantially against the US dollar, nullifying any 
calculations of profitability made at today’s exchange rates. 
                                                           
1 Under anti-dumping regulations agreed in the Uruguay Round, a firm whose home currency has appreciated 
must adjust its foreign prices to the change within 60 days to avoid being charged with dumping; de minimus 
margins for dumping, including "dumping" produced by changes in exchange rates, are only two percent.  In 
short, the anti-dumping rules expose normal business practice of list pricing to foreign customers to 
protectionist action in the presence of routine movements in exchange rates. 
    9
  We should note another potential source of disturbance: the creation of the euro out 
of ten pre-existing currencies in early 1999.  A number of economists (e.g. Bergsten(1997, 
1999), Masson and Turtelboom(1997), Portes and Rey(1998)) have suggested that exchange 
rate volatility between the dollar and the euro may well be higher than it was between the 
dollar and the German mark before 1999.  The reasons are partly structural -- euroland is 
much more self-contained than the individual countries were, so exchange rate variation will 
cause fewer internal disturbances, hence fewer calls for action to stabilize exchange rates; 
and partly institutional, since the newly created European Central Bank is charged with 
pursuing price stability, not stabilizing currency values
2.  Thus the ECB need pay attention 
to exchange rates only insofar as their movements threaten price stability, and 
pronouncements by the ECB indeed indicate relative indifference to the dollar-euro 
exchange rate, except for several interventions in the fall of 2001, when the euro had 
depreciated extraordinarily. 
  This greater volatility could be greatly aggravated if during the next decade foreign 
exchange holders around the world decide to switch their claims substantially from US 
dollar-denominated ones to euro-denominated ones, as some have suggested will occur (e.g. 
Bergsten (1997), Portes and Rey (1998)).  I have argued elsewhere (Cooper, 1999) that a 
rapid large-scale switch from dollars to euros is not likely to occur because of the absence of 
sufficient suitable euro-denominated securities, and that growing internationalization of the 
euro will occur more gradually and smoothly in a context of world economic growth.  But if 
a rapid switch does occur, it is likely to take place in several episodes rather than all at once, 
leading to episodic depreciation of the dollar, but at a rate and to an extent that is impossible 
to predict, since the potential for such switching will be seen to be very large. 
  Exchange rates are increasingly determined by financial transactions, which 
overwhelm trade and other current transactions in their magnitude. Financial transactions are 
subject to bandwagon effects, as each player seeks to be ahead of others in the market, and 
institutional investors seek performance that does not deviate negatively from performance 
of their peers. Yet the erratic exchange rates determined by such behavior also govern 
                                                           
2 Gros (1999) is more skeptical that dollar-euro exchange-rate volatility will be higher than pre-1999 dollar-
DM volatility.  
   10
international trade.  Particular trade transactions can be financially hedged in the short run, 
at a cost; but investment for the purpose of engaging in trade cannot be similarly hedged.  
The result is likely to be both too little total investment, and too much investment in the 
wrong places, driven by the need of firms to hedge by locating within each major currency 
area, even if economic efficiency would be better served by locating elsewhere and 
importing.  Furthermore, sustained misalignment of exchange rates is likely to increase 
protectionist pressures, as it did in the United States during the mid-1980s and in Europe 
during the early 1990s.   
  In short, movements in exchange rates, while providing a useful shock absorber for 
real disturbances to the world economy, are also a substantial source of uncertainty for trade 
and capital formation, the wellsprings of economic progress.  Whatever benefits flexible 
exchange rates may provide as a shock absorber, and they are real, will be increasingly 
dominated and eventually overwhelmed by the costs of flexible exchange rates as a 
generator of economically unjustified shocks to productive activity.  This worsening cost-
benefit ratio makes a case for a common currency among the world’s major economies.  A 
common currency at the core of the world economy will also make easier the management 
of exchange rates by other countries. 
 
The adjustment mechanism 
  How would the adjustment process work with such a scheme in place?  How often 
would it have to work?  Asymmetrical real disturbances leading to payments imbalances 
would of course lead to monetary contraction in regions experiencing negative shocks, and 
to monetary expansion in regions experiencing positive shocks.  Those changes alone would 
lead to economic contraction and economic expansion, respectively.  The possibility of 
economic contraction in response to negative shocks leads many economists to prefer 
flexible over any form of fixed exchange rate.  Several important mitigating circumstances 
need to be mentioned. 
  First, Europe, Japan, and the United States are all large, highly diversified, open 
economies, so the likelihood is low that asymmetrical shocks would affect them 
differentially in a quantitatively significant way.  Shocks for each region as a whole are   11
likely to be diversified, and largely offsetting.  (It is this factor that leads to some doubts 
about the inclusion of countries such as Australia or New Zealand, with their relatively high 
dependence on exports of primary products.  But a decade or two hence they may be more 
highly diversified.) 
  Second, asymmetrical monetary shocks will virtually disappear with a common 
currency; that indeed is the point of the proposal.  Neither diverse monetary policies nor 
diverse expectations about future movements of exchange rates would create adjustment 
problems among the participating regions, as they do now and will increasingly do in the 
coming years.  These translate into real shocks through the movement of real exchange 
rates, a source of asymmetrical real disturbance that would be eliminated under the proposal. 
  Third, such asymmetrical real shocks as might occur can be mitigated by offsetting 
fiscal action, focussed on non-tradable goods.  Governments would not of course have direct 
access to the common Monetary Authority; but they would have access to a broad capital 
market covering all of the participating countries. 
  Fourth, real wages could if necessary, over time, move down as well as up, since 
monetary policy focussed on the producer price index (see below) would leave room for 
differential movements in consumer prices.  An international regime in which monetary 
authorities all successfully stabilize consumer prices requires long-run flexibility in 
exchange rates so long as nominal wages are inflexible downward, as they seem to be.  
Anchoring monetary policy in stable producer prices would avoid this implication. 
 
Implications for non-members 
    Few countries of the world either have or desire freely floating exchange rates.   
Many fix their currency to some leading currency (or a basket of them); others allow market 
flexibility but intervene in the foreign exchange market to guide market expectations and to 
influence the exchange rate.  Floating exchange rates among major currencies creates both a 
policy problem and an operational problem for these countries.  The policy problem is to 
decide to which of the major currencies (or what combination of them) to orient the 
currency in question, and the operational problem is to choose a currency in which to   12
engage in market intervention.  These problems would not be acute if the major currencies 
did not move significantly against one another, and if such movements as did take place 
reflected mainly inflation differentials among the major countries, as was thought to be the 
case by advocates of flexible exchange rates in the 1960s (e.g., Johnson).  But major 
currencies have in the past decade experienced major swings against one another, creating 
serious problems for some, perhaps many, third countries in their exchange rate 
management.  One of the advantages of a common currency in the core of the world 
economy is that countries could confidently frame their exchange rate policies with respect 
to this common currency – either fixing to it, if that seemed best, or maintaining a managed 
float against it.  It would provide monetary stability for the world economy.   
Many countries, including some eligible to join the common currency (e.g. 
Australia), might find it advantageous not to do so.  The more specialized an economy, 
especially in its foreign trade, the more subject it would be to asymmetric shocks, and the 
more useful might be a separate currency with its own exchange rate to provide a shock 
absorber in such situations.  Each eligible country would decide for itself where the balance 
of costs and benefits lay, and of course this calculation might change over time. 
 
Transition: getting from here to there 
McKinnon (1984, 1996) has proposed an alternative, but not entirely dissimilar, 
arrangement between Germany, Japan, and the United States (EMU could easily be 
substituted for Germany).  Concretely, as applied to Japan and the USA (see McKinnon and 
Ohno, 1997), the proposal involves determining a target exchange rate based on purchasing 
power parity of wholesale (not retail) prices and establishing a permissible band of 10 
percent around this rate, with soft edges.  The width of the band would be narrowed over 
time, as confidence in the system grew.  Monetary policy in both countries would be keyed 
in the long run to stabilizing the respective domestic wholesale (in the US, producer) price 
indices.  Concerted market intervention would attempt to keep exchange rates within the 
permissible band, but such intervention would not be completely sterilized, to allow 
exchange rate intervention to influence domestic monetary conditions.   13
    Wholesale prices are dominated by tradable goods, and lack domestic sales taxes 
and retail mark-ups.  They also exclude services.  Thus there should be a high correlation in 
the movement of British, European, Japanese, and American wholesale prices, such that 
monetary policy in each entity would be targeted on roughly the same price index
3.  If they 
were successful, inflation rates measured by consumer prices in these regions would differ 
for a variety of reasons (e.g., changes in sales tax rates, greater competition in retail trade, 
changes in mix of services consumed and in prices of services), but such differences would 
presumably have little impact on international trade.  Stability in wholesale prices would 
anchor monetary policy.  Since price stability in wholesale prices would lead to some 
inflation measured in consumer prices, that would introduce some flexibility for adjustments 
in real wages in the face of nominal wage rigidity, thus facilitating adjustment to shocks 
both within and between economies.  Stability in consumer prices, in contrast, introduces 
relative price rigidity in the presence of downward price inflexibility, which is widely 
observed, and thus impedes adjustment.  
As an interim process for getting from here to the common currency, the prospective 
members could adopt the Keynes/McKinnon approach, described above, of targeting 
monetary policy on stabilizing national indices of producer prices.  With low trade barriers 
these will be made up mostly of tradable goods competitively linked through foreign trade 
(some agricultural products are today the major exception, but even agricultural trade may 
be more liberalized after another round or two of multilateral trade liberalization).  Over 
time, the indices could be brought into close direct correspondence, even be made formally 
identical.  International consultation and even coordination could take place over when (if 
ever) particular price movements might be excluded, e.g. an exceptional rise in world oil 
prices.  (Indeed, prices of all crude materials might be excluded from the targeted index 
from the start.)  Success in stabilizing closely related price indices in the participating 
regions should lead to medium run convergence of exchange rate expectations.   
 
                                                           
3 In discussing international coordination of policies Keynes (1930) suggested that all major countries target the 
same index of prices of a basket of internationally traded commodities, ranging from aluminum to zinc.   
Concretely, writing under a gold standard, he suggested adjusting the official conversion price of gold 
periodically to maintain its value in terms of an index of 62 commodities -- the equivalent of targeting price 
stability of the index.   14
Conclusion 
  The proposal for a common currency among the large industrial democracies 
draws its rationale from three empirical prognosications.  The first is that international 
financial transactions will continue to grow relative to international trade in goods and 
services, and that financial factors will come to dominate exchange rate determination 
even more than they do today.  At the same time, the exchange rate will become even 
more important, as economies integrate further, in determining the profitability of trade 
and investment than it does today. 
  The second prognostication is that real shocks among these large economies will 
not be radically asymmetrical.  Because they are large and diverse, disturbances within 
these economies are likely to be more important than disturbances between them, and 
adjustment to such shocks will be no more difficult, and perhaps easier, than adjustments 
to shocks within these economies. 
  The third prognosication is that financial markets will be just as fickle in the 
future as they have been in the past.  That is to say, they will continue to fail to satisfy 
Harry Johnson’s contention that they are far-seeing and universally stabilizing in their 
behavior. 
  Under these circumstances, by eliminating monetary and exchange rates as 
sources of asymmetric shocks among the participating countries, a common currency will 
conduce to more stable economic activity and possibly higher growth.   15
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One World Money, Then and Now 
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  There is an undeniable and immediate appeal about the idea of a single world 
currency, analogous to that of a universal system of measurement.  We are all frustrated 
whenever we try to change money at apparently unfair prices in airports or hotels.  In 
1866 a U.S. Congressional Coinage Committee expressed exactly this sentiment when it 
concluded that “the only interest of any nation that could possibly be injuriously affected 
by the establishment of this uniformity is that of the money-changers – an interest which 
contributes little to the public welfare.” (Russell 1898, p. 35)  Going beyond the personal 
feelings, it is possible to make a broader argument.   
  One argument is about what we might like to do:  In a global and inter-connected 
world, we should like to be able easily to assess values and prices and compare them 
from one end of the world to the other.  The attraction of a single world currency is that it 
makes a simple snapshot comparison of prices at any one moment.  Walter Bagehot and 
his influential periodical The Economist in the mid-nineteenth century pleaded vigorously 
in favor of what seemed like a common sense solution: “Commerce is anywhere 
identical: buying and selling, lending and borrowing, are alike all the world over, and all 
matters concerning them ought universally to be alike too.” (Bagehot 1869) This obvious 
appeal was accepted by all the luminaries of the time, including John Stuart Mill and 
Stanley Jevons.  Over a century later, the frustration of losing money in repeated 
conversion transactions was often given as a rationale for European monetary union, and 
the same argument can today obviously be made on a wider and global scale.   
  A second version of the argument is stronger and predictive: it is about what we 
will do.  In his work on “The Origin of Money”, Carl Menger (1892) at the height of the 
previous wave of globalization argued that the advantage of using the same medium of   17
exchange as one’s potential trading partners leads a network of merchants to accept a 
common medium of exchange and unit of account. 
  In the nineteenth century, the idea of global currency convergence was greatly 
furthered by the chance nearly (but unfortunately not complete) neat arithmetic ratio of 
the major currencies, nearly five francs to one dollar, and nearly five dollars to one 
pound.  At the beginning of the twenty-first century, at the moment when the euro rose 
from its original value to parity with the dollar, and the dollar was nearly an 
arithmetically neat figure of one hundred yen, the world currency movement received a 
further boost. 
  A third version of the argument emphasizes policy advantages.  Thus, in a recent 
survey of “Financial Statecraft”, Benn Steil and Robert Latin argue that a widespread 
dollarization would reduce the risk of financial crises in emerging markets.  A more 
universal currency would minimize the risk of disastrous consequences of those crises, 
which include pauperization, the rise of anti-globalization sentiment, and the spread of 
mafia-like organizations that breed on financial distress (Steil and Litan, 2006). 
  In this paper, we look at the major arguments for monetary simplification and 
unification before explaining why the nineteenth century utopia is an idea whose time has 
gone, not come. 
 
1. Transaction costs: 
  The most obvious consequence of a universal standard of monetary measurement 
is that it makes transactions easier and cheaper, and might thus be expected to increase 
the number of mutually beneficial economic interactions.  At the outset of the last great 
era of globalization, in the 1850s and 1860s, with a move to free trade following the 
Cobden-Chevalier Treaty of 1860, a serious effort to introduce a unified world money 
occurred.  Already in 1848 John Stuart Mill in the Principles of Political Economy 
casually remarked that only political obstacles stood in the way of an inevitable world 
monetary unification (“let us suppose that all countries had the same currency, as in the 
progress of political improvement they one day will have”, Mill, p. 614).  The transaction   18
costs of a diversity of coinages was very considerable, since precious metal coins (of 
different degrees of fineness) circulated across national frontiers, and created complicated 
problems of measurement.   
  Some of the answers, it was hoped, could be found in regional monetary unions, 
in that neighboring countries tended to trade more frequently with each other, and 
currencies moved across their frontiers.  The most important and influential such union, 
although not the most successful one, was the Latin Monetary Union of 1865, which was 
intended as a solution to the problem of silver coins of 835 fineness minted in Italy and 
Switzerland flooding into France and Belgium, where a 900 fineness was still in place.  
Each country still minted its own coins, but they were of a standard weight and fineness, 
so that the Belgian, French and Swiss francs and the Italian lira were in practice identical.  
The high water mark of the movement to world money was the international monetary 
conference called by Napoleon III in 1867, which was intended to establish a similar 
agreement on a broader international stage. The extension of the LMU principle – 
originally developed in the 1863 International Statistical Conference in Berlin - would 
involve a definition of a dollar as an equivalent to five francs, and of the British pound to 
five dollars or twenty-five francs.  Such a redefinition would mean only relatively small 
changes in the metallic equivalent of the U.S. and British currencies (the pound was at a 
par of 25.22 Francs). 
  In the debates of the 1860s, some economists drew on historical arguments in 
their support.  The Franco-Polish economist L. Wolowski in 1868 quoted Turgot as 
stating that “gold and silver are constituted, by the nature of things, as money and 
universal money, independently of all convention and all law.” (Einaudi  2001 p.76)  Mill 
set out by regarding money as a foreign commodity, whose “value and distribution must 
therefore be regulated, not by the law of value which obtains in adjacent places, but by 
that which is applicable to imported commodities – the law of International Values.” 
(Mill, p. 607) 
  The reference to Turgot makes the most important point about these early debates.  
They proceeded from the assumption of a universal reference in metallic money, and   19
aimed at the simplification and rationalization of national moneys in terms of weights of 
precious metals.   
  The vision of 1867 was never realized, and the experience of the 1860s is a good 
illustration of some of the difficulties on the road to monetary union.  The small 
differences in existing values from the 25:5:1 ratio frustrated any agreement.  The British 
delegates thought that the world should be united around a sterling standard, Americans 
already looked to the dollar, a few Germans thought that a new German currency could 
be the basis for the world’s money, and most of the French unsurprisingly liked Napoleon 
III’ suggestion, which the principal French negotiator, de Parieu, liked to trace back to 
Napoleon’s uncle musing on the state of the world on the island of Saint Helena.  (A 
small minority, however, called for a more rationally decimal approach, in which the new 
currency would simply be based on decimal multiples of grams of gold.) (Einaudi 2001) 
  The major gains of such a move would have been a simplification of some of the 
more complicated arithmetic of currency conversion in making commercial transactions 
in the late nineteenth century.  But it would not have made much of a difference in policy 
terms to a world where the major industrial countries in practice accepted the gold 
standard from the 1870s. 
 
2. Establishing credibility  
  The second argument for ambitious schemes of cross-national monetary 
integration is concerned with improving the policy environment.  In particular, there 
arises in some political cultures a conviction that the state cannot really be trusted to 
maintain a stable currency, usually because of a poor fiscal regime and strong political 
pressures.  Hence pressure for independent central banks, or – in an environment when 
these too would be likely to be influenced by the pervasive force of politics – for making 
a money that is incapable of abuse.  The argument about the desirability of “tying hands” 
(a term originally coined by Giavazzi Giovannini and Pagano, 1986) was the most 
frequent one made in the early stages of the debate about a move to a European Monetary   20
Union, when in the 1980s many European states had a very bad policy environment 
(Giavazzi Giovannini and Pagano, 1986; Melitz, 1988) 
  The character of the political problem is easily demonstrable by reference to the 
early history of the Latin Monetary Union (Einaudi). Not all governments found it easy to 
maintain the policies that would sustain convertibility.  Italy posed a problem to the LMU 
because it almost immediately faced the massive cost of the war of unification against 
Austria (1866) and introduced an inconvertible paper currency issued by the central bank 
(Banca Nazionale nel Regno).  Another problem was highlighted when another high 
deficit country, the small Papal States, joined the LMU, and over-issued low value silver 
subsidiary coinage.  Napoleon III swallowed his outrage because he did not want to 
offend French Catholics by condemning the monetary policy of the Holy Father.  When 
other countries, such as Greece, wanted to join the LMU, France insisted that the Greek 
subsidiary coinage be minted in France, in order to subject the quantity of issue to real 
control.  Without really tight and complete domestic controls, the only way of making the 
international monetary union incapable of abuse was an extensive restriction of 
sovereignty.   
  Sovereignty became more and more important as a political good in the course of 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, with the advance of democracy or popular 
government.  This trend was already obvious in British populist reactions to the 
government’s plans of the 1860s to go for an international currency by making a slight 
alteration to the British mint parity.  The satirical magazine Punch accused the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer of “debasing the sovereign ... to please the French.” 
(Einaudi, p. 156) 
  Since larger scale war was infrequent in the nineteenth century (with the 
exception of the German, Italian and U.S. civil wars or wars of unification in the 1860s), 
the fiscal issues behind the confidence debate did not appear as clearly as they did in the 
twentieth century.  But it was not just a matter of military cost: the twentieth century was 
the great period of national money, in which states insisted on monetary sovereignty in 
order to facilitate domestic policy objectives (especially full employment) (Polanyi 1944, 
Eichengreen 1992a).  States also appreciated the room that monetary policy gave for the   21
expression of power in international affairs (Gilpin 2000). But both of these applications 
involved high costs, and generated inflation and hyper-inflation.  The increasingly urgent 
proposals for world money are best understood as ways of reducing these costs.  It was 
vital to endow a currency with an external source of credibility.  
  “Hard fixes” that looked closer to monetary unions were adopted largely in order 
to establish anti-inflationary credibility in political economies that had been destroyed by 
prolonged experience of fiscal deficits and inflation.  The hard fixes – or more generally 
the bolder and more comprehensive proposals for world union – were also intended to 
deal with the so-called “original sin” problem (Eichengreen and Hausmann 2004): the 
weakness in emerging market economies that results from the inability to borrow long-
term in domestic currency.  In emerging markets, companies faced an unpleasant choice, 
in that if they incurred liabilities in domestic currency, they could only borrow short term 
and there would be a term mismatch with their assets.  If they borrowed in a foreign 
currency, they would be vulnerable to exchange rate deterioration.  The consequence is 
that such companies did not borrow as much as they should have done; and this result 
may help explain the well known Lucas paradox that so little capital actually flows to 
poorer economies where there are plentiful potential productivity gains (Clemens and 
Williamson 2000). In addition, sovereign borrowers in emerging markets with original 
sin risk debt crises because of balance sheet mismatches following sudden stops or 
reversals of capital inflows. 
  Like the LMU, the historical record on this search for externally endowed 
credibility is at best patchy.  Most of the very celebrated fixes, whose architects were 
feted as the heroes of international finance, came unstuck within a decade or less: the 
great German stabilization of 1923-4 after the hyper-inflation, when Hjalmar Schacht 
orchestrated a very hard fix on the dollar, which blew up in the world depression; the 
Chilean stabilization of 1979, which led to a banking and financial crisis three years later; 
or Domingo Cavallo’s currency board-like stabilization of Argentina in 1990 (Frankel 
and Rose 1998).  The development of the European Monetary Union is impressive, but 
the institution of independent central banks was laid down in the Maastricht Treaty as a 
prerequisite for the accession to the monetary union; and it might be argued that with a   22
credible commitment to independent central banks there was no longer any need for the 
additional step of monetary union as a disciplining measure. 
 
3. Stopping bad policy in other states 
  A frequent source of concern in the international monetary system, however, is 
not concerned with bad policy in one’s own country, but about the bad effects of 
spillovers from bad policy in other countries, especially very powerful countries.  This 
case for monetary internationalism was made very forcefully by von Hayek in the 1930s, 
which was the great age of monetary nationalism as well as of strikingly bad policies.  
Hayek reached the conclusion that “independent regulation of different national 
currencies cannot be regarded as in any sense a substitute for a rationally regulated world 
monetary system.” (von Hayek, 1939, p. 74) 
  In the postwar era, the main form this sentiment took was the belief that the 
policies of the United States were harming the rest of the world.  This sentiment gave rise 
to Keynes’ attempt to devise bancor as a non-dollar currency; to the famous Rueff and de 
Gaulle critique of the mid-1960s, as well as to French attempts to introduce a collective 
reserve unit (which in a very watered-down version produced the SDR, which cannot 
really be regarded as a money); to later attempts at the IMF to devise a “substitution 
account”; and was an accompaniment at both a political and academic level to the 
European drive to monetary integration.  In 1988, for instance, Robert Triffin renewed 
the critique of the “fantastic US deficits and capital imports” which were “unsustainable 
as well as unacceptable” and revived the idea of a substitution account denominated in 
ECUs. (Triffin 1988, 42)  French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaingat the first economic 
summit at Rambouillet in 1975 denounced flexible exchange rates as a “decadent” idea 
that fostered the abuse of monetary standards. 
  If it were true that one large and powerful country were pursuing very harmful 
monetary policies, this line of argument would have an obvious appeal; but at the same 
time, it might well face difficulties in actually implementing a world monetary reform, in 
that the large country might well not feel sympathetic to the critique and would use every   23
opportunity to block or frustrate the implementation of “reform”.  Such was indeed the 
fate of bancor, the French 1960s CRU, and the substitution account. 
 
4. Political integration via money 
  Most of the literature on monetary unions puts a great degree of emphasis on 
“political will” as explaining the emergence and also the collapse of monetary unions.  
Nineteenth century Europe in consequence developed a state theory of money, associated 
most prominently with G.F. Knapp.  Most successful cases of currency unions emerged 
in a national setting, such as the United States or the German Empire of 1871, where a 
single political system was required before currency could be standardized.  The 
monetary unions were successful when the political situation worked.  Conversely, the 
Austro-Hungarian currency union, and the single currencies of Yugoslavia and the Soviet 
Union fell apart with the dissolution of the political structures that had kept them in place. 
(Cohen 1998; Bordo and Jonung 2003)  Political integration in this rationale appears as a 
necessary and inescapable accompaniment of monetary integration. 
  At the end of the twentieth century, the idea of supranational monetary unions 
was revived again, especially in Europe.  Some of the rationale behind European 
monetary integration was concerned with a reduction of transactions costs as a way of 
making capital markets operate more efficiently; and with establishing an externally 
generated mechanism in some states (notably Italy) that could give political weight to 
fiscal reform.  But there was a third, and more fundamental, driver of European monetary 
integration. In Europe, the push to monetary union was part of a process that was 
intended to drive closer political union, and the logic of monetary union required (and 
continues to require) a further degree of political coordination, in particular in regard to 
fiscal policy.  This had been seen from an early stage.  Already in 1950, Jacques Rueff 
had prophesied that “Europe will be made by money or it will not be made.”   
The fading attractions of monetary union: 
  The reasons for monetary integration as set out above are becoming increasingly 
less persuasive.    24
1.  The transaction costs argument is obviously permanently attractive, but transactions 
costs have been reduced by more extensive currency markets and by the possibility of 
using hedging to eliminate risk in forward transactions.  Most analysts now recognize that 
the theory of optimum currency areas does not fit very well with the story of actual 
monetary unions.   
  The Optimum Currency Area argument was developed in the early 1960s by 
Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969) early in response to the ongoing 
debate over fixed versus floating exchange rates.  An OCA was viewed as a geographic 
area in which the benefits of a single currency in terms of reduced transaction costs 
outweighed the costs of giving up the use of domestic monetary policy to offset the 
effects of asymmetric shocks.  The early approaches to OCA assumed a Keynesian world 
with nominal wage rigidity and labor immobility.  In such an environment a monetary 
union between disparate regions would only work to the extent that it was complemented 
by a fiscal union (fiscal federalism), which would compensate those areas already 
affected by the shocks which an independent monetary policy could have offset.  Such a 
fiscal arrangement generally depends on a high degree of political integration.  In 
addition to the degree of labor mobility, the theory stressed openness: the more open an 
economy as measured by the share of traded goods, the greater the benefits of a reduction 
in transaction costs. 
  OCA criteria were extended for the discussion about EMU in the 1980s and 1990s 
(Eichengreen 1996).  Empirical evidence on the degree of labor mobility within Europe, 
the incidence of asymmetric shocks, and the possibility of fiscal federalism concluded 
that the European Union was not an OCA, and that it compared unfavorably with the 
experiences of federations such as the US or Canada.  Despite this negative evidence, the 
EMU project was successfully driven forward by the political agenda for European 
integration.  
  A recent evaluation (Bordo 2003) suggests that since the launching of EMU, 
limited progress has been made in meeting the OCA criteria.  This raises the possibility 
that areas which do not qualify ex ante as OCAs may actually ex post become OCAs.  
Frankel and Rose have thus recently argued that ex post integration of goods and capital   25
markets follows monetary union.  In rationalizing production across national boundaries, 
the asymmetry of real output movements between members is reduced, and hence there is 
less of a need either for fiscal transfers or for the preservation of independent monetary 
policies.
1  
  The recent debate seems to reinforce the conclusion of Goodhart (1995, p. 452) 
that : “The evidence therefore suggests that the theory of optimum currency areas has 
relatively little predictive power.... The boundaries of states rarely coincide with optimum 
currency areas, and changes in boundaries causing changes in currency domains rarely 
reflect shifts in optimum currency areas.” 
2.  In terms of economic stabilization, original sin is becoming less of a problem with a 
combination of a better policy environment in many emerging markets, and more 
sophisticated financial markets.  Mexico, for instance, in 2000 started to issue three and 
five year fixed rate bonds, and by 2003 was issuing twenty year bonds. Moreover in 
smaller advanced countries which have original sin in the sense that they needed to issue 
foreign currency denominated debt, the likelihood that this exposed them to financial 
crisis  is remote ( Bordo and Meissner 2005 ).   Indeed over the past fifteen years, many 
countries have embarked on a “graduation” that makes the discipline imposed by a strong 
or irrevocably fixed external anchor less essential to economic success. 
3.   Monetary policy in the world in general is improving with a better understanding of 
appropriate goals and instruments.  In particular, there is a generalized understanding that 
bad policy hurts the country that is pursuing it, without bringing much in the way of long 
term gain.  Advanced countries have developed a domestic fiat money nominal anchor 
based on central bank independence and inflation targeting (both explicit and implicit). 
There is hence less of a need for coercive action to stop big and powerful states from 
undertaking the wrong sort of monetary action.  Apart from this, it would not be easy to 
make such external pressure on policy really effective.  
4.   On the political level, it is doubtful whether monetary and political union can any 
longer be presented as the reason why states in contemporary Europe are unlikely to go to 
                                                           
1  Eichengreen 1992b and Krugman 1993 present the opposed case, that monetary union leads to increased 
specialization between countries rather than rationalization, and hence increases rather than reduces the   26
war with each other.  The European experience is also recognized as a quite unique one, 
that is not easily transferred to other parts of the world.  The political framework 
underpinning EMU depended on two states of more or less equivalent economic weight, 
France and Germany, reaching a balanced deal.  It is difficult to see what state 
relationships would provide a similar basis for monetary integration in East Asia, Latin 
America, or the Middle East. 
A new view of money: 
  We have a different concept of money to the one that underlay the nineteenth 
century discussions.  Then there was an assumption of a single reference external to the 
state, which was most obviously reflected in the definition of value in terms of precious 
metals.  We might term this a Newtonian conception of the world, in which there are 
measurable terms that can be used to establish fixed and determinate relations.  (By a 
curious coincidence, Isaac Newton was one of the key influences in establishing this view 
of money in Britain, whose currency order proved to be paradigmatic for nineteenth 
century stabilization).  Mill described “the whole doctrine of international values” as 
possessing “a unity and harmony which is a strong collateral presumption of truth.” (Mill, 
p. 627) 
  In the twentieth century, however, views of money shifted to a more Einsteinian 
or relativistic conception.  Measures of value that can move relative to each other are 
helpful in terms of dealing with large shifts in relative prices, that will affect different 
countries very differently.  In particular, we may not wish so much to use money as a 
metric to compare all international prices at one moment, but rather to compare prices 
over a time dimension in one particular context.  But in order to do this, a different 
management of money is appropriate in different contexts. 
  In particular, globalization is associated with big changes in the relation of 
tradable to non-tradable prices.  Emerging market countries are likely for some time to 
experience rising inflation as prices for services rise, corresponding to the increased 
incomes producers of tradables derive from selling to global markets (Belassa effect).  
                                                                                                                                                                             
likelihood that the correlation of output movements would be negative.   27
Correspondingly, mature markets are likely to experience periodic bouts of anxiety about 
deflation, as competition on markets for tradable goods and services drives down prices.   
  Requiring these two types of countries to have a single currency or a permanent 
fix would be likely to produce serious problems in one or both.  The mature markets 
should have monetary policies that are less restricted than they were in the past by fears 
of deflation.  The emerging markets should be free to conduct tighter policies to 
minimize the possibilities of destabilizing surges in asset prices.   
  In the absence of the monetary flexibility given by an exchange rate system, 
political pressures in both blocs will be likely to lead to the adoption of measures that are 
more destructive of prosperity than a multiplicity of currencies: in particular, the mature 
economies would be more likely to see the solution to the deflationary danger in terms of 
measures of trade protection and restriction.  Moves to world currency would therefore be 
likely to lead to restrictions on world trade; and the world trade system is better off with 
the possibility of adjustment mechanisms through exchange rates. It is the demand for an 
adjustment mechanism that the Einsteinian view of monetary standards can satisfy, and 
the Newtonian one cannot.   
The history of relations of core and periphery: 
  The tensions between core and periphery have a historical dimension that makes it 
difficult to conceive of a true global currency, as opposed to a small-scale union between 
a number of countries at the core (such as EMU) or at the periphery (such as the CFA 
franc area).  Such strains can be observed in previous monetary eras, when the 
international monetary order, under the gold standard or in Bretton Woods, mimicked 
aspects of an international money.  Under the pre-1914 gold standard, the core or 
developed countries were fixed on gold, but the periphery had episodes of trying to 
conform to the golden rule, and then being forced off (Bordo and Flandreau 2003).  That 
was an exercise in transferring instability and its costs from the core to the periphery, that 
could be managed politically in a world of imperialism (in some cases, such as the British 
empire, the extension of imperial rule with its guarantees of order may have provided a 
compensatory counter-weight to the instability generated by the single money).  It could   28
not really be managed in a world in which the periphery has a greatly enhanced self—
confidence, and in which democratic institutions are spreading.
2 
  A good – if terrifying – example of what can go wrong is of one peripheral 
country which for reasons connected both to international political prestige and because it 
hoped to get better access to foreign funds believed it should tie itself to the gold standard 
of the core.  In order to join the single world money of the time, Russia under Finance 
Ministers Bunge and Vishnegradskii first imposed a severe deflation on itself, that is 
often blamed for the famine of the early 1890s; then it experienced a series of asset price 
booms and busts tied to inflows of foreign capital.  In relation to industrial shares and 
other securities, some of the cost was born by foreign investors; but in regard to 
agricultural property, the inflation of assets radicalized the small farm owners, and 
contributed to the growth of revolutionary sentiment.  
  Another famous example of the difficult of monetary management in the 
periphery was Argentina, which (like Russia) was growing in the late nineteenth century 
at a spectacular pace.  Within four years of stabilizing the currency on a metallic standard 
(in 1881), it experienced a surge of capital inflows (with a current account deficit of 38 
percent of GDP in one year, 1884), and a wave of speculation that led to the government 
introducing a separate, domestic paper standard.  Again, and as in Russia, inflation and 
speculation prompted massive social unrest. 
  The Bretton Woods era has recently been at the center of a revival of interest, as a 
model for Asian currencies’ relations to the U.S. dollar.  Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and 
Garber 2003 suggest that it offers an attractive analogy in that dynamic Asian producers 
have accepted a mutually beneficial bargain similar to that of West Germany and Japan in 
the 1960s.  In this interpretation, dynamic growth areas are happy to accept an 
undervalued exchange rate and imported inflation in order to generate jobs by an export 
subsidy through the undervalued currency.   In Germany and Japan, export interests 
pressed heavily against any suggestion of revaluation, in the Japanese case blocking it 
                                                           
2   There was no obvious solution to the problem of the periphery: countries that avoided the gold standard 
discipline and floated suffered the adverse balance-sheet effects of devaluations; while those who followed 
the gold standard ran the risks of speculative inflows followed by collapses.  Both cases are explicable as a 
weakness following from inadequate financial development, that goes deeper than simply the question of 
the choice of exchange rate.   29
entirely, and in the German case delaying revaluations until they were both too late and 
too small to correct the problem.  DFG interpret the modern Chinese commitment to 
maintain a peg, with only small or cosmetic shifts, in a similar way.  It cannot be 
explained on stability or anti-inflationary grounds.  The mutual benefits mean that this is 
a quite stable system, that would offer a suitable basis for a world money. 
  The parallel between the 1960s and the present is actually not a very good one.  In 
particular, it is not clear that the 1960s deal was perceived as being mutually beneficial in 
Japan or Germany, and these countries (equivalent to an emerging market periphery) had 
no input in making U.S. monetary policy.  There is no doubt, however, that the result was 
highly controversial in Germany and Japan in the 1960s.  It clearly brought a high level 
of inflation, which was offensive in particular to an emerging sense of what the 
Bundesbank’s theorists liked to refer to as a “stability culture”.  The surplus positions and 
capital flows which were the consequence of the increasing undervaluation of the 
expanding currencies were absorbed by central banks, which saw big increases in their 
dollar reserves.  In the face of some criticism from the central banks, the German and 
Japanese governments explained the accumulation of reserves as a price their countries 
needed to pay for the security provided by the United States.  Indeed, the Bundesbank 
President, Karl Blessing, in March 1967 signed the so-called Blessing letter, in which he 
committed the Bundesbank not to exchange its surplus dollars for gold in an explicit 
recognition that this was the price that Germany needed to pay for the maintenance of the 
U.S. military presence in Germany. 
  There is clearly no modern analogy to this side of the Bretton Woods bargain.  
China has no reason to imagine that it should defer to the United States over security 
issues.  Both sides are likely to have long term divergences in the interpretation of where 
their interests lie.  The U.S. will be worried about deflation and the loss of jobs; and 
China will want to raise incomes more substantially in order to ward off political 
discontent.  If these preferences emerge as major political themes, the link between the 
currencies becomes unsustainable.  The Chinese preference would seem deflationary to 
the US, and the US preference inflationary for China.  (This kind of divergence over 
overall goals is already notieceable in the debate about whether Lithuania and Estonia are   30
suitable candidates for EMU because of their high inflation rates, that demand a stricter 
monetary response.)  
  It is striking how the most widely touted proposals for world money do not 
attempt to deal with the issue of who is making policy and in whose interest.  Robert 
Mundell’s most precise formulation of the path to world money took an agreement of a 
“G-3” (the United States, Euroland and Japan) as its basis: “The simplest approach would 
be to select one currency as the anchor and assign the central banks of the other two the 
task of keeping their currencies fixed to the anchor currency. Responsibility for monetary 
policy would be coordinated by the anchor currency area. Other things being equal, the 
largest currency area would be the best candidate as anchor.”   This approach may appeal 
to European sensibilities, in that it identified Europe as providing the largest currency 
area.  But it is already beginning to look dated.  Should we use the renminbi as the anchor 
currency when China becomes the largest currency area? 
  The currency arrangements of the past that most resembled a proposal for a world 
money relied on the clear strategic superiority of the part of the world whose money was 
the key to the international system.  Many observers in consequence believed that the 
security system and the monetary order were intertwined.  When both the security and the 
economic balance is shifting quickly, as they are at present, the political dynamics that 
are essential to successful currency and monetary unions are simply not there.   
Fortunately, “Einsteinian money” is capable of accommodating shifts that were 
politically destructive in the Newtonian world.    31
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This note evaluates the prospects for a world currency, using as a departure point the 
papers by Bordo and James (2006) and Cooper (2006). The note argues that a world 
currency is unlikely in the foreseeable future and probably undesirable. Although more 
evidence is needed, there seem to be no strong forces towards the creation of new 
monetary unions among the countries with major currencies or between those countries 
and the periphery. Based on recent experience, the note also argues that one of the main 
benefits to establish a world currency, the elimination of exchange rate uncertainty, is 
likely less important than commonly believed. No matter how rigid a currency 
arrangement is, initiatives to dissolve it tend to appear as bad times arise. Still, the present 
equilibrium of no world currency leaves unresolved many difficult issues related to the 
functioning of the domestic and international monetary systems. 
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The debate on the merits of a world currency and, more generally, currency 
unions and hard pegs continues to receive the attention of world-renowned economists. 
Two good recent examples are the papers by Bordo and James (2006) and Cooper (2006) 
on the prospects for a world currency. Other good examples are Mundell (2005), Obstfeld 
(2000), and Rogoff (2001). The opinions are quite diverse and contradictory. At one 
extreme are Cooper (jointly with Mundell), proposing one currency mainly for Europe, 
Japan, and the U.S. At the other extreme, Bordo and James argue that the historical 
proposal for a world currency is an idea “whose time has gone, not come.” 
The debate about a world currency is part of a larger debate on whether countries 
should fix or float their exchange rates. For those who believe that financial market 
imperfections or monetary shocks are the primary sources of disturbances, it is natural to 
propose fixing the exchange rate, and at the extreme eliminating the currency, to reduce 
those shocks. They would argue that these shocks negatively impact investment and the 
overall real sector, generating efficiency losses. Also, to the extent that there is a 
significant transaction cost to convert currencies, abolishing a currency would increase 
trade and economic activity. See, for example, Frankel and Rose (1998, 2002). These 
arguments tend to be stronger for the case of less developed countries, where 
governments introduce more shocks on the financial/monetary side, lack credibility, and 
have consequently underdeveloped financial sectors. The recent thinking disfavors soft 
pegs, arguing for rigidly fixing through currency boards (although they also became 
somewhat discredited after the Argentine crisis), unilateral adoption of other currencies, 
or a monetary union. On the contrary, those who believe that idiosyncratic shocks to 
fundamentals are relatively more important tend to support flexible currency 
arrangements. They would argue that exchange rates act as shock absorbers under 
nominal rigidities and asymmetric shocks, facilitating the adjustment of the economy. 
See, for example, Broda (2004), Duarte and Obstfeld (2005), and Edwards and Levy-
Yeyati (2005). 
The arguments in favor and against a world currency tend to be based on a-priori 
views on the relative importance of different shocks. More work would be needed to 
substantiate the pros and cons of a world currency, and back the assumptions behind   36
those claims. The paper by Bordo and James provides some historical analysis in this 
direction.  
In this note, I provide some additional evidence based on recent experiences. In 
particular, I argue that the recent history makes a world currency unlikely in the 
foreseeable future and probably undesirable, thus agreeing more with the position of 
Bordo and James as opposed to that of Cooper. There seem to be no strong forces 
towards the creation of new monetary unions among the regions with major currencies 
(Europe, Japan, and the U.S.) or between those regions and the periphery. If any currency 
union were to materialize, the more likely scenarios would be regional arrangements or 
the unilateral adoption of major currencies by less developed countries. I also argue that 
one of the main benefits to establish a world currency, the elimination of exchange rate 
uncertainty, is likely less important than commonly believed. No matter how rigid a 
currency arrangement is, initiatives to dissolve it tend to appear as bad times arise. 
Despite the unlikely prospects for a world currency, the present equilibrium leaves 
unresolved many difficult issues related to the functioning of the domestic and 
international monetary systems.  
In the rest of the note, I illustrate first how exchange rate uncertainty is not 
completely vanished, even in very rigid currency arrangements. Then, I discuss the 
prospects for future currency arrangements. 
 
2. Some recent evidence on currency disarrangements 
Although one of the main arguments in support of a world currency is to reduce 
financial and monetary shocks, countries continue to be subject to idiosyncratic external 
shocks, even if a country’s currency is abolished. Here I illustrate with three examples 
how countries try to adjust to negative shocks and how arrangements that appear very 
rigid become unsustainable and tend to disintegrate. As a result, monetary and financial 
discipline is not as strict as commonly believed and uncertainty remains, as the system 
seeks solutions to circumvent the constraints imposed by rigid arrangements.    37
The first case is that of Argentina, which had a currency board for almost 11 
years. This regime basically backed each peso one-to-one with U.S. dollars held by the 
central bank, tightening the monetary authority’s ability to print money and devalue. 
After the Asian, Russian, and Brazilian crises, Argentina fell in a currency-debt-growth 
trap. The currency became overvalued, debt turned unsustainable, and the economy 
became stagnant. The situation deteriorated in 2001, with people fleeing the system and 
exchanging pesos for dollars. As the economy suffered a sharp monetary and real 
contraction, the federal and provincial governments with little resources started to issue 
their own currencies to pay public employees, as illustrated by Figure 1. The 
phenomenon was so widespread that these quasi-monies accounted for 27 percent of the 
cash and quasi-monies in circulation in March 2002, with a total of 13 quasi-monies 
issued, including one by the federal government. See Figure 2. That does not count the 
quasi-monies issued by the new private barter clubs, which emerged to mitigate the 
deteriorating economic contraction. See Figure 3. Argentina was forced to abandon its 
currency board, devalue, and default between late December 2001 and early January 
2002. 
One could naturally argue that the case of Argentina is special and would not 
apply to a monetary union among developed countries. While it is true that Argentina is 
perhaps extreme, it serves to illustrate how a very rigid monetary arrangement that lasted 
for a long time could be dismantled in a relatively short span. Two other examples show 
that backlashes are not necessarily specific to developing countries. 
Discussions in Europe suggest that the euro, perhaps the most prominent and 
successful monetary union, could also be subject to setbacks. Several articles and 
comments already discuss the possibility of Italy leaving the euro, while the party “Liga 
Norte,” allied to Prime Minister Berlusconi started a campaign against the euro, blamed 
for the economic recession. See, for example, Bloomberg June 24, 2005 and Europa 
Press June 21, 2005. Moreover, in the 2006 Davos conference, Nouriel Roubini argued 
that the economic divergence in Europe is “a serious problem for some EMU countries 
(Italy, Portugal, and Greece) and … may eventually lead to a collapse of EMU.” Also 
Martin Wolf argued in the Financial Times (May 25, 2005) that “a forced withdrawal 
from the eurozone is perfectly conceivable” in the case of Italy.   38
Another example is the U.S. during the recession of the early 1990s. Maurice 
Obstfeld (2000) said that to deal with the contraction “the state of California even 
attempted to run an independent monetary policy by issuing I.O.U.s, which were later 
ruled unconstitutional, and paying state workers with them.”  
In sum, these examples suggest that any currency arrangement could be dissolved, 
and that monetary uncertainty is never vanished completely, even in the most solid 
currency regimes. While the exit costs rise with the rigidity of the system, lowering the 
probability of exit, the breakups of rigid arrangements also tend to be more costly. 
 
2. Prospects for future currency arrangements 
Based on the recent experience and discussions, one could argue that a world 
currency is unlikely to materialize soon, and even in the long run. First, there does not 
seem to be consensus on world currency. First, there is no political will to create that type 
of arrangement at present times. Moreover, the cost-benefit analysis of different regimes 
does not seem to favor fixed regimes. Developed countries do not need a fixed regime to 
gain credibility and are unlikely to enter into arrangements with developing countries. 
Moreover, to the extent that financial markets generate volatility, credible monetary 
authorities can dampen it with effective policy instrument. Not even in developing 
countries there is consensus for fixed regimes. However, in some cases, regional 
arrangements might be favored or the adoption of a strong currency by small open 
economies, integrated with a major country, is at times suggested. 
Despite the apparent poor prospects for establishing a world currency, there are 
still many complex unresolved issues in the international and domestic monetary systems 
that will continue to generate substantial debate. For example, how much attention should 
be given in developed and developing countries to fluctuations among major currencies? 
How should emerging economies be integrated to the international financial system? Can 
and should they let their currencies fluctuate freely? How could that fluctuation be 
achieved without undermining their domestic economies? What is the optimal level of 
reserves for emerging countries? What currencies should be used as reserve currencies?   39
How extensive is the appearance of “graduation” of some emerging economies? How 
much long-term debt can they issue in domestic currency to avoid mismatches? How 
much monetary independence can developing countries achieve? How dependent are they 
on changing international financial conditions?  
To conclude, it is difficult to conceive a world with a one currency. But that does 
not mean that the current monetary arrangements in the world lack problems or are 
sustainable. Opinions on the optimal arrangement are varied and change over time, 
depending on political and economic events. Expect more proposals in the years to come.   40
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